


Investor Survey NEST - Results -

Survey from September 10 to September 30, 2025

Participants who have consented to the publication of their names.

- Deutsche Bank
- Barclays
- Citigroup
- Bank of America
- ING Bank
- Deutsche Kreditbank AG (DKB)
- Helaba
- Bernstein
- ATLAS Infrastructure
- Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners
- APG Asset Management
- Versicherungskammer, Bayern Versicherungsanstalt des öffentlichen Rechts
- M 31 Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. Energie KG
- Morgan Stanley
- Elia Group
- EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG
- Swiss Life Asset Managers
- Bayerngas GmbH
- N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie
- GIC Pte Ltd.

A total of 33 investors, analysts and financial advisors took part in the survey.




As far as we are aware, there has been no explicit structured involvement of investors in the NEST consultation – even though this stakeholder group contributes **significantly to the financial viability of the grid infrastructure.**

In order to reflect this perspective nonetheless, the BDEW conducted a survey among relevant market players.

Figure 1: Distribution of survey participant groups.

How intensively are you engaged with the development of German incentive regulation / with NEST?




We surveyed investors of various sizes.

The analysis of the results shows that **85% of respondents are (intensively) engaged** with the development of the German incentive-based regulation.

Figure 2: Significance of NEST

How do you rate the switch to a WACC approach from an investor's perspective?




Almost half of all respondents view the introduction of the WACC as neutral.

In particular, international investors tend to perceive the introduction of the WACC rather as an improvement.

Figure 3: Switch to WACC


How do you assess the BNetzA approach of relying exclusively on historical data for the equity return calculation?



Around 90% assess BNetzA's decision to rely solely on historical data for determining the equity return rate as **rather negative** to **very negative**.

Figure 4: Continued reliance on the historical excess return approach


What equity return after (all) taxes do you consider necessary to ensure that investments in German networks remain attractive?



70% consider an after-tax equity return of at least **8 %** necessary, to ensure that investments in German networks remain attractive.

Figure 5: Equity return after taxes

Does an updated rolling average for the debt interest rate, also for existing assets, represent a better option than fixing a historical average?



For **55%**, a rolling average for the cost of debt is considered **rather a better option** than relying on a fixed historical average.

Figure 6: Rolling average for the debt interest rate

How important is a cost-covering, risk-averse recognition of debt capital costs from an investor's perspective?





Figure 7: Cost-covering recognition of dept capital costs


From an investor's perspective, is it possible to refinance existing assets if the regulatory debt interest rate is structurally below the refinancing conditions of the network operators?



For **around 70%** of respondents, refinancing existing assets is considered **rather unlikely** if the regulated cost of debt is structurally below prevailing refinancing conditions.

Figure 8: Refinancing of existing assets under structurally low debt interest rates


Given fluctuations in interest rates, is a rolling adjustment of the average debt interest rate for the existing Regulated Asset Base appropriate?



For roughly **90%** of respondents, the volatility of interest rates makes a rolling adjustment of the average rate for the existing RAB a **suitable approach**.

Figure 9: Rolling adjustment of average debt interest rate, given fluctuations in interest rates


How relevant are the BNetzA's planned restrictions on network operators' opportunities for outperformance from an investor's perspective?



Over **70%** of respondents regard the planned limitations on performance incentives as **rather to highly relevant**.

Figure 10: Significance of restrictions on opportunities for outperformance

In light of the increasing investment needs: Is the regulatory framework, in your view as an investor, suitable for enabling network operators to raise the required equity and debt capital?



2/3 of the participants consider the future regulatory framework to be **rather unsuitable or clearly unsuitable** for meeting the increased financing needs of the energy transition – with **12%** viewing it as clearly unsuitable.

Figure 11: Overall regulatory framework

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